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T h e majority of C a n a d i a n families have two income earners. Yet the tax system continues to u p h o l d the 
patriarchal, heterosexual family model based on the sexual divis ion of labour which treats the husband as the 
breadwinner and the wife as the economically dependent full-time homemaker. Whilst married couples do not file 
a joint tax return, the C a n a d i a n tax system contains a number of features that allow a married couple specific tax 
benefits. These reveal the patriarchal bias of the tax system. T h i s paper explores them and argues for the ending of 
all tax breaks on the basis of sex, marital or family status i n the interest of sex and marital status equality. 
Marriage and the Tax System 
Canada introduced its first Personal Income 
T a x Act in 1917, when the need to increase 
government revenues to finance the war effort 
make such a step inevitable. In spite of the fact 
that the individual was then and is still today the 
basic tax unit, the personal income tax system 
had from the beginning a definite bias for the 
patriarchal, nuclear form of the family in which 
women are economically dependent on men. 1 
Yet this bias is not immediately apparent since it 
would appear on the surface that women and 
men are treated as separate and independent 
income tax payers, whether they are married, 
and/or have family responsibilities or not. 
By contrast, in the United States married cou-
ples are given the option of f i l i n g a joint return 
which is aimed at letting them pay less taxes 
than they would pay if assessed separately. In 
Canada the income tax system provides tax pay-
ers who live in a legally validated marital rela-
t ionship with a number of tax exemptions, 
deductions and spousal transfer arrangements. 
These tax concessions allow married individuals 
whose income is large enough to make ful l use of 
these considerable tax reductions. The benefi-
ciaries of most concessions are men who are 
l ikely to be the higher-income spouse because of 
the existing unequal income distribution pat-
tern between men and women. It would almost 
seem as if the marriage related tax breaks were 
specifically designed to allow high-income men 
to use their marital status to reduce their tax 
burden and to treat their dependent wives as tax 
shelters. 
Whilst it is not difficult to expose the specific 
bias of the personal income tax for the patriar-
chal , nuclear family, as we w i l l see later, it is 
quite a different matter to demonstrate its gender 
bias in favour of men. The Personal Income T a x 
Act after a l l does not insist that the higher-
income spouse be male. Some people might even 
want to argue that the various ways by which 
taxpayers are able to reduce their taxable income 
in relation to their marital or family status are in 
fact gender neutral because they can be claimed 
by both women and men. Such a contention 
ignores, however, the fact that in Canada today 
the economic, pol i t ical and social power is still 
predominantly in the hands of men; 2 and that 
there is sti l l widespread disagreement as to the 
seemingly unreconcilable role of women as pro-
ducers i n the work force and as reproducers of 
the future generation and caregivers in the 
home. 3 The reality is that women earn on aver-
age 40% less than men. This means that whilst 
they are i n pr inciple able to use the same tax 
shelters as men if their incomes were high 
enough to do so, their lower earnings and their 
domestic responsibilities make them the depend-
ents of men. 
Women's Dual Role as Paid and Unpaid Workers 
In this sense the existing gender inequalities 
of the tax system have to be considered as reflec-
tions of the inequalities of the earnings structure 
which discriminates not only between gender 
groups but also wi th in them. The interplay of 
the gender divis ion of labour and class relations 
raises two conceptual and practical problems 
which are particularly significant in relation to 
the operation of the tax system. These are firstly, 
the relationship between people as individuals 
and as family members w i t h i n class relations as 
reflected by the marginally progressive income 
tax structure; and secondly, the relationship of 
the domestic labour of housewives to the rela-
tions of production and its recognition by the tax 
system. The current tax convention is to define 
the class position of married women in the home 
as dependents of their husbands and to treat 
domestic labour as the privatized production of 
use-values consumed by the family . 4 , 6 So far, this 
interpenetration between the role of women as 
income earners and their role as household pro-
ducers has largely been ignored by the tax system 
and has led to the particularly serious discrimi-
nation of women employed in part-time work. 
In 1983, 20% of the work force in Canada were 
part-time workers, those working under 30 hours 
a week; and 72% of these were women. 6 More 
often than not, their earnings are so low that they 
could not even take advantage of the most stand-
ard tax deductions and use the tax shelters that 
are so beneficial to higher-income earners. Part-
time workers very often do not qualify for cover-
age by the social insurance programmes and 
cannot use the premium deduction through the 
income tax to buy themselves even a modicum of 
social security. In this way they lose out twice, as 
low income earners and as taxpayers who cannot 
benefit from the tax system. 
But the tax system does much more than 
ignore the double role of married women and 
female parents in Canada today. Women in this 
double role have become a majority. In 1980, 62% 
of al l married women and 50% of mothers with 
children under the age of six worked for pay. 
T h i s means that the majority of families have 
two income earners now. 7 Yet the tax system 
continues to operate as if these social changes in 
families had not occurred. It still upholds the 
traditional gender division of labour and the 
patriarchal, heterosexual family model where 
the husband is the breadwinner and the wife the 
full-t ime homemaker, who is to be his depend-
ent because she has little or no income of her 
own. As a result, in a majority of al l husband-
wife families, marriage to a dependent wife has 
to be considered a primary tax shelter for hus-
bands in high-income brackets. 
Transferrable Tax Deductions Between Spouses 
Marriage allows a number of specific tax 
benefits. Whilst in Canada married couples do 
not file joint tax returns, as in the U.S. and other 
Western countries that allow them to pay less 
taxes than they would pay as two separate indivi -
duals, the transferrable deductions between 
spouses under the Canadian Income Tax Act 
serve basically the same purpose. Thus one 
spouse can c laim all or part of the other spouse's 
available deductions from interests and div i -
dends from Canadian corporations, the age 
exemption, the disability as well as the educa-
tion deduction. This becomes possible only if 
one spouse has no taxable income in the first 
place or has been able to reduce his or her taxable 
income to zero without exhausting the available 
deductions. If both marital partners still owe 
taxes after having used al l available deductions, 
there is nothing left to transfer. 
A substantial tax saving occurs when one 
spouse can take over a l l interests and dividends 
earned by the other spouse in a particular year. 
This is possible if the spouse's net income, for 
instance in the tax year 1985, was not over 
$510.00. Thus the spouse f i l ing the tax return 
can claim not only the maximum married 
exemption of $3,630 but also benefit from the 
favoured tax treatment given Canadian div i -
dends. Contr ibut ing to a low-income-earning 
spouse's Registered Retirement Savings Plan 
provides further immediate tax savings, and at 
the same time gives a couple a chance to provide 
for their financial security in old age through the 
use of tax deductions. Whilst this is a form of tax 
evasion for many husbands in high-income 
brackets, it also provides their wives with an 
income in their retirement years even in the event 
of a divorce since the R R S P becomes the prop-
erty of the spouse in whose name it was opened. 
The spouse's federal tax reduction which has 
been cut back from $200 for the tax year 1984 to 
$100 in 1985 again is particularly useful for the 
breadwinner-homemaker couple. It benefits 
couples i n the lower taxable income brackets the 
most. A spouse with a taxable income of $1,430 
and over in 1985 could no longer claim this tax 
reduction. 8 
The education deduction of $50 a month for 
the time a dependent spouse was attending fu l l -
time a designated educational institution or 
enrolled in a qual i fy ing educational programme 
can also be claimed for a dependent chi ld. 
These transferrable deductions al low consid-
erable tax savings for married individuals whose 
taxable income is such that they can make fu l l 
use of them. The range of tax deductions, a l l 
highly regressive as w i l l be shown later, attach 
special tax savings to marital status. O n the 
whole they are not useful to a couple who both 
hold jobs unless one spouse is in a much higher 
income bracket than the other. But they can 
make a signficant difference in situations where 
one spouse is a full-time homemaker or perhaps 
a university student wi th little or no income. In 
the case of one-income couples they, therefore, 
have to be considered to operate to a certain 
extent as a work disincentive for the lower-
income spouse. In the majority of cases this 
wou ld be the woman because of the structural 
disadvantages women have to face in employ-
ment policies and pay rates in the labour market. 
The income tax system only compounds the 
problem by treating women as the dependents of 
men, and therefore a tax l iabil i ty which warrants 
a tax exemption. 
T h e Marital Exemption 
For one-income couples the marital tax exemp-
tion, because of its size, constitutes the most gen-
erous and beneficial tax shelter. But it is also one 
of the most controversial tax deductions since it 
specifically supports the full-time homemaker 
role, and therefore, impl ic i t ly the economic 
dependency of women on men. The married 
exemption signals to Canadians that their govern-
ment is only w i l l i n g to recognize and support 
the dependent homemaker role within legally 
validated marriage, whilst refusing to do so in 
the case of homosexual couples, and those l iv ing 
in a common-law relationship. If this was not 
the case, there would not be any reason to deny 
this tax privilege to couples not l iv ing in a mari-
tal relationship. The same argument can be made 
i n relation to the c la im that the married exemp-
tion specifically recognizes the value of domestic 
labour. The value of housework of the depend-
ent partner in a homosexual or common-law 
relationship most certainly also deserves recog-
nit ion by the tax system. This k ind of differentia-
tion between couples w o u l d seem to support the 
married exemption as the symbol of the state's 
endorsement of both the patriarchal family 
model and the recognition of the value of mar-
ried women's domestic labour alone. 
Th is certainly seems to be the position of 
R . E . A . L . Women of Canada, an organization 
c la iming to speak for homemakers concerned 
with the preservation of traditional family values 
and the patriarchal family model. According to a 
recent article in Chatelaine 9 , it was Judy Erola's 
suggestion, as the Federal Minister Responsible 
for the Status of Women, to eliminate the mar-
ried exemption i n favour of increased govern-
ment aid for child-care expenses that lead to the 
emergence of this group. Their objections are 
that increased child-care expense deductions 
would encourage more women to seek employ-
ment outside the home, and that such a devel-
opment would further undermine the recogni-
tion of the role and the value of the homemaker. 
It is for this reason that they vehemently insist 
that their husbands are entitled to the married 
exemption in recognition of the value of domes-
tic labour which they contribute to their fami-
lies' overall standard of l iv ing . Yet it seems 
surely ironic that women's domestic labour 
would gain recognition by g iv ing their hus-
bands more money. 
The Nature of Tax Exemptions 
T o insist that the married exemption is an 
appropriate form to recognize the value of 
domestic labour seem questionable. There can-
not be any doubt that domestic labour is abso-
lutely essential to carry out the important part of 
the reproduction and maintenance of the present 
and future labour force, and thus benefits the 
well-being of the family in general. But if 
women's work in the home constitutes a benefit 
to the family, why should they then be consid-
ered a tax l iability which entitles their husbands 
to a tax deduction? Far from recognizing women's 
contributions to the material circumstances of 
families through their domestic labour, the mar-
ried exemption seems to ignore it by identifying 
homemakers as dependents and thus as burdens 
on their husbands. 
A completely different view on the social 
valuation of housework from that of R . E . A . L . 
Women has been put forward by Louise Dulude, 
who described the married exemption as "relic of 
the early days of the tax system, when the value 
of a homemaker's work was considered to be so 
low that a wife at home was understood by al l to 
be a burden rather than an asset to the f a m i l y . " 1 0 
The difference in these points of view hinges not 
so much on a differentiation in the valuation of 
domestic labour but on the nature of tax exemp-
tions. The meaning of the claims for personal 
income tax exemptions have to be clearly under-
stood. They are granted by governments to 
reduce the taxable income of tax payers i n 
recognition of the financial costs incurred to 
support dependents or to offset other socially 
accepted contingencies such as reduced income 
i n old age, or the special expenses of the bl ind 
and the disabled confined to a bed or a wheel-
chair. Women who contribute by their domestic 
labour to the material and emotional well-being 
of their families hardly fall into any of these 
categories and therefore cannot be seen as tax 
liabilities. 
Furthermore, tax exemptions are far from 
being a progressive, equitable tax instrument. 
They always have a greater cash value for higher 
income groups than for those with a lower 
income. This is because they reduce taxable 
income in proportion with the increases in the 
marginal tax rate by income brackets. The wife 
of a taxpayer in the 50% tax bracket is, therefore, 
worth more to h i m in tax savings than the wife 
of a man whose income is taxed at a 30% tax rate. 
Th is would mean that the domestic labour of the 
wife of the higher-income earner is valued more 
by the tax system than that of the wife of the 
husband with the lower income. Such a differen-
tiation seems hardly fair, particularly in the case 
of housewives who are able to hire domestic help 
and pay another women to do the work, while 
their husbands are still able to claim the married 
exemption. 
The Equivalent-To-Married Exemption 
In spite of its name, the equivalent-to-married 
exemption is really a child-related tax deduc-
tion. It recognizes the special financial needs of 
single parents who can claim it for one chi ld 
instead of, but not in addition to, the considera-
bly lower chi ld tax exemption. It specifically 
recognizes the financial burden of a mother or 
father who has to assume a double parenting 
role. If there are more children in the family, 
ranging perhaps from 13 to 19, it is more advan-
tageous to claim theequivalent-to-married exemp-
tion for the younger chi ld to be able to also use 
the larger tax exemption for a dependent chi ld 
over the age of 18. The equivalent-to-married 
exemption is not l imited to children alone, but 
can be claimed for other dependent relations by 
blood, marriage or adoption. The exemption is 
reduced in accordance with the dependent's net 
income. Its partriarchal bias becomes clearly 
apparent in the restrictions that specify claims. It 
cannot be claimed if the mother is supported by 
another person and, therefore, is not considered 
the main provider for the chi ld. 
The E l iminat ion of the Married Exemption 
Judy Erola's suggestion of dropping or at least 
reducing the married exemption was not new. It 
had been advanced by the 1970 Royal Commis-
sion on the Status of Women not to disparage the 
role of homemaking but to enhance it. The 
Commission based their recommendation on 
their position that women engaged in supplying 
services to their families should not be consid-
ered as a dependent class which reduce the tax-
able capacity of their husbands but in fact 
enhance i t . 1 1 
Theory of the Imputed Value of Housework 
According to the theory of imputed income, 
developed by Douglas G . Hartle, the "provis ion 
of housekeeping services to oneself and one's 
family adds to the tax capacity of the individual 
or family just as the sale of labour services for 
cash adds to taxable capacity." 1 2 T o arrive at the 
imputed value of housekeeping services, Hartle 
proposed a weighing of the estimated costs of 
purchasing housekeeping services in the market 
against the foregone cash income of women who 
remain outside the work force. The first part of 
his calculation would mean that the value of 
domestic labour could be measured by how 
much it wou ld cost to replace the unpaid labour 
of the full-t ime housewife by a paid worker. It is 
the second part of his formula that seems prob-
lematic, since how much a woman can earn i n 
the labour market depends not only on the 
supply and demand of labour, but also on the 
strength of collective bargaining, traditional 
and conventional income differentials and other 
intractable factors. Whilst the theory of imputed 
income, therefore, is only of l imited usefulness 
to arrive at the monetary value of domestic 
labour, it is certainly a helpful conceptual tool to 
recognize the important contribution women 
make to the well-being of their families. Further-
more, once it has been accepted that domestic 
labour indeed has economic value, it is hardly 
possible to continue considering housewives a 
tax l iabi l i ty which should be recognized by the 
state in the form of a tax deduction. 
T h e Inclusion of the Homemakers into the 
C / Q P P 
Proposals for the inclusion of homemakers 
into the C / Q P P is a fiscal as well as a social 
welfare issue, since it raises the question as to 
who is to pay for the coverage of homemakers. 
Proponents of a homemaker pension c laim that 
it is the most logical step to recognize the value of 
domestic labour. The Parliamentary Task Force 
on Pension Reform in its December 1983 Report 
rationalized its recommendation for the inc lu-
sion of homemakers into the Canada/Quebec 
Pension P lan by arguing that "women who run 
a household, care for children, husbands and 
other relatives - do work that has real economic 
value. The work of homemakers has been ignored 
for too long; they deserve pensions in their own 
r i g h t . " 1 3 Entitlement to the homemaker pension 
as outlined by the Task Force Report would 
represent certain anomalies in the assessment of 
the economic value of homemaking. Thus , only 
full-time homemakers and those earning less 
than half the average wage of $11,400 in 1984 
would qualify for the homemakers pension. 1 4 By 
impl icat ion, the homemaking services of work-
force participants earning more than that amount 
would go unrecognized. There is overwhelming 
evidence that household chores are not equally 
shared among two-income couples and that 
wives in paid employment continue to do the 
bulk of domestic labour. 1 5 T h e National Coun-
c i l of Welfare, therefore, asked quite correctly 
why homemaker services provided by those who 
do not fit the Task Force definition should go 
unrecognized, if the purpose of the pension is to 
establish the economic value of domestic labour. 1 6 
The Price of Labour 
The confusion over the unpaid value of 
domestic labour is related to the general misun-
derstanding of the price of paid labour in the 
production process. Workers who have to depend 
on their ability to sell their labour power in order 
to make a l i v i n g , sell it for a certain amount of 
time, i.e., the work day, in return for an income. 
However, for capital to make a profit, workers 
are paid only for that part of the work day that 
w i l l cover the costs to feed, dress and house them 
and reproduce the next generation of workers. 
T h u s the price of labour is measured by the costs 
of reproduction. The remaining hours of the 
workday for which workers are not paid, are 
appropriated by capital as profit. Women's 
labour which frees men from having to provide 
housekeeping services for themselves and from 
having to take care of children reduces the costs 
of reproduction and, therefore, the price of 
labour. "Housework, as it is currently organ-
ized," wrote Nancy Chodorow, "creates greater 
profits, since direct market payments for al l of a 
worker's physical requirements and for daycare 
is unquestionably more expensive than the mar-
ginal addition to a worker's salary to support 
this fami ly . " 1 7 
Exist ing income levels, therefore, reflect not 
only the value of productive labour performed in 
the work force, but also the value of reproductive 
labour in the home. The productive and repro-
ductive divis ion of labour between men and 
women makes marriage an economic partner-
ship, and the income paid to one is in fact an 
income earned by both. It should be pointed out 
here that this type of economic partnership only 
applies to the breadwinner-homemaker relation-
ships since the domestic labour of the home-
maker which breadwinners otherwise wou ld 
have to perform themselves, increases their pro-
ductive capacity. The same argument can be 
applied to the private and public pension bene-
fits accumulated by the spouse in paid employ-
ment. These benefits again are jointly earned by 
the couple through the labour of one partner in 
the production process and the other partner i n 
the reproduction process. This means, of course, 
that income and pension benefits, because they 
are earned by both, should belong to both. 
Demands for the splitt ing of al l assets inc luding 
pension entitlements acquired by the couple 
during their married life are based on this k ind of 
reasoning. If domestic labour was recognized i n 
this way, full-time homemakers would be i n -
cluded automatically into the C / Q P P . The 
automatic splitt ing of pension entitlements be-
tween spouses seems a more equitable way to 
recognize that they were accumulated through 
the joint labour of both spouses. In this way the 
discounting of the value of domestic labour per-
formed by women i n paid employment with 
earnings above the average income level could 
thus be avoided. 
Different Options 
Another way of solving the issue of domestic 
labour w o u l d be to separate the child-rearing 
and care-taking tasks for dependent disabled 
adults as a social service from the homemaking 
services of one spouse for another as a private 
service. Margrit Eichler, for instance, has argued 
that the provider of a social service should qual-
ify for social benefits, but " n o benefits should be 
transferred to a family wi th a dependent spouse 
provided both spouses are mentally and physi-
cally f i t . " 1 8 T h e French government recognized 
the importance of child-rearing as a social con-
tribution i n 1938 i n its code famiale. One-
income families are paid an income-related 
child-raising allowance, known as salaire uni -
que, which is reduced when there is only one 
school aged ch i ld i n the family and peters out 
when a l l children have left school . 1 9 In Bri tain 
people qualify for a special allowance if they 
care for a severely disabled ch i ld or adult family 
member. In both countries these benefits are 
provided through the social security system and 
not by the tax system. 
In Canada the social significance of chi ld-
rearing has been given recognition by the drop-
out provision i n the calculations for pension 
entitlements under the Canada/Quebec Pension 
Plan . Th is provision should be extended to 
those caring for a severely disabled adult. The 
introduction of the drop-out clause is based on 
the expectation that care-givers w i l l eventually 
return to the work force in order to bui ld up their 
own pension entitlements. Th is is a realistic 
expectation i n relation to child-rearing obliga-
tions, but may be quite impossible for those 
providing care for a disabled person. The special 
needs of such a person may require permanent 
care and the care-giver, therefore, may not be 
able to return to the work force. Since these care-
givers are providing a service that benefits society 
as a whole, they could be paid a special care 
allowance with an opt ion to pay the allowance 
into the Canada/Quebec Pension P lan . Such a 
provision w o u l d provide them wi th income 
security i n old age. 
The C h i l d Care Exemption 
The personal income tax gives l imited recog-
ni t ion to the fact that i n approximately 60% of a l l 
families both husband and wife are i n the work 
force. The c h i l d care exemption partially com-
pensates the costs of ch i ld care for parents who 
need it i n order to earn an income from employ-
ment, self-employment, training courses, research 
or similar k i n d of work. In the past only women 
could c la im the chi ld care exemption. When this 
obvious gender bias was finally removed, certain 
qualifications were introduced which ensured 
that women as the lower income partner i n a 
marital relationship have to c la im it. T o be el igi-
ble a women has to meet certain conditions: (a) 
be a single parent without a supporting person, 
i.e., a husband, or (b) her income has to be less 
than her husband's, or (c) if her income is greater 
than that of her husband's, chi ld expenses have 
to have occurred i n a period in which (i) she lived 
for at least three months apart from her husband, 
because of a family break-up or (ii) the husband 
was attending an educational institution, or (iii) 
the husband was inflicted with an inf irmity, had 
to serve a prison term or was confined to an 
institution for at least two weeks. The m a x i m u m 
c h i l d care deduction is $2,000 per c h i l d wi th a 
m a x i m u m of $8,000 per family or u p to 2/3 of 
the claimant's income, whatever is the least 
amount. Given the real costs of day care, this 
deduction seems woefully inadequate. T h e tax 
systems fails to recognize the importance of 
child-care expenses to working mothers. 
Since e l igibi l i ty for the c h i l d care deduction is 
based on the income of the claimant, it can be 
claimed by students ho ld ing a scholarship or 
receiving a bursary, but not by regular students 
without an income. T h i s is clearly an inequita-
ble situation for mothers wishing to upgrade 
their marketable skills through education. A 
possible alternative solution would be to treat 
the c h i l d care deduction as a ch i ld tax credit. Its 
focus would shift then from the income of the 
claimant to the actual costs of chi ld care outside 
the home, and this, of course, is precisely where 
the focus should be. 
Tax Differential between One- and Two-Income 
Couples 
D u r i n g its hearings, the Royal Commiss ion 
on the Status of W o m e n 2 1 had received a number 
of briefs arguing that the tax system was discrim-
inat ing unfairly against married women i n the 
work force. The focus of their criticism was the 
dollar for dollar reduction of the married exemp-
tion for husbands whose wives earned more than 
$250 but less than $1,200, or in 1985 figures, more 
than $510 but not more than $4,140. The married 
exemption is reduced by every dollar earned by 
the dependent spouse d u r i n g that year, and is 
totally eliminated when the net earnings exceed 
the amount of the tax exemption. At that point 
dependent spouses have to file their own income 
tax return. A substantial reduction of the mar-
ried exemption can mean a considerable tax 
increase for husbands in the upper tax brackets. 
This led the Royal Commission on the Status of 
Women (1970) to conclude that this sharp deduc-
tion rate might act as a work disincentive for 
women whose earning power was l imi ted . 2 2 
T h e Royal Commiss ion on Taxat ion (1966) 
had not shared this concern. 2 3 Their particular 
focus had been the overtaxing of taxpayers wi th 
dependent children compared to childless cou-
ples if in both situations the wife is treated by the 
tax system as a dependent spouse. The tax 
exemption for children under 18 is $710 for the 
tax year 1985 and $1,420 for children over 18 
years of age whose income was not more than 
$2,720. If the children earn an income the tax 
exemption is reduced in the same way as the 
married exemption. So far there has been little 
concern that the dollar for dollar reduction of the 
exemption might act as a work disincentive for 
youth. Th is difference in public interest between 
the marital and the ch i ld tax exemption may 
well be related to the difference in size between 
the two exemptions. They are clearly wrongly 
apportioned in size and purpose for the higher 
value is attached to the wife, who provides serv-
ices to the family, instead of to the chi ld , who 
requires service. 
Th is was the o p i n i o n of the Royal Commis-
sion on Taxation which recommended a sub-
stantial reduction of the married exemption and 
a corresponding increase in the chi ld tax exemp-
tion. Th is option has not found any support in 
government circles nor among the general pub-
l ic . In fact, i n its recent consultation paper, 
C h i l d and Elderly Benefits, the Conservative 
Government of Brian Mulroney is proposing in 
its two options to restructure the three federal 
chi ld benefit programmes: family allowances, 
the chi ld tax credit and the chi ld tax exemption, 
to phase out the latter completely or to reduce it 
by $500 to $210 a year. 2 4 Th is step would , of 
course, only further increase the tax burden of 
parents, many of whom are single women, in 
comparison to childless couples and indiv idu-
als, if there is not an offsetting increase in the 
other two chi ld benefits. T h u s it would seem 
that maintaining the married exemption and 
abol ishing or reducing the chi ld tax exemption 
wou ld make marriage appear to be socially more 
valuable than raising a c h i l d . 2 5 In the May 1985 
budget the federal government restructured the 
existing chi ld benefits. The chi ld tax exemption 
of $710 a year for children under the age of 18 is 
to be gradually reduced from 1987 to 1989 when 
it w i l l have equal value with family allowances 
and remain at that value. Whilst this measure 
has been greeted as a progressive step favouring 
low-income parents, it still maintains to a lesser 
degree the regressive principle of tax exemp-
tions. Family allowance increases were restricted 
to the annual inflation rate above 3% which 
meant an increase of 31 cents per monthly 
cheque per ch i ld in January 1986 instead of an 
increase of $1.40 had family allowances remained 
fully indexed. The refundable chi ld tax credit 
w i l l increase by $75 per chi ld in 1986 and $35 in 
each of the fo l lowing years unt i l 1989 to offset 
the reductions in the two other chi ld benefits. 
S t i l l , low-income parents would be better off in 
1989 had the "unfa ir " previous benefits remained 
in place. A one-income family with an income of 
$20,000 a year and two children loses $78 income 
in chi ld benefits under the restructured benefit 
system. It took real ingenuity on the part of the 
federal government to actually pay less chi ld 
benefits while c la iming to have made the chi ld 
benefit system more equitable. 
Family Taxation 
The Canadian tax system is generally assumed 
to operate on the principles of horizontal and 
vertical equity. This means that tax payers with 
the same income should be treated equally by the 
tax system. The Royal Commission on Taxation 
had raised the question whether the same tax 
liabil i ty should apply to two-income couples, 
two single individuals and one-income couples 
with the same income. The Commission showed 
that the tax system based on the individual as the 
basic tax unit favoured two-income couples over 
the one-income couples, and argued that this 
offended the principle of horizontial equity 
because the family's total ability to pay taxes 
rather than that of individual family members 
should be taken into account when assessing tax 
l iabi l i ty. It, therefore, recommended that the 
family should become the basic tax unit. The 
Royal Commission on the Status of Women 
supported this proposal on the basis of Hartle's 
theory of imputed income mentioned earlier and 
its belief that this would mean the recognition of 
the contributions made by mothers and wives in 
the home. 2 6 By doing this the Royal Commis-
sion on the Status of Women seemed to recognize 
that women and men occupy different spheres of 
social life and pressed for a proper appreciation 
of women's work and their responsibility for 
domestic labour. But with more and more 
women combining their domestic responsibil-
ities with paid employment, such considerations 
seem today curiously out of date. Women and 
men increasingly occupy the same spheres of 
social life. Sooner or later, the tax system w i l l 
have to recognize the dual responsibility of 
women in the home and in the work force. 
Furthermore, comparing the contributions to 
G N P (the volume of a l l commodities and serv-
ices provided in the economy) by two income 
earners with the contribution of one income 
earner, and keeping in m i n d that the woman i n 
the work force also performs domestic labour, it 
is difficult to maintain that two people earning 
an income, even if they live together, should be 
treated by the tax system in the same way as one 
person whose income is the same as theirs. These 
three income earners differ not only in their 
work-related expenses, but also in inconven-
iences associated with the wife assuming a dou-
ble workload. When a woman chooses paid 
employment over domestic labour, she incurs 
opportunity costs of holding a job such as job-
related expenses, autonomy lost, and risks and 
worries gained. 2 7 
There are other expenses as well . If the couple 
do not work in the same place, their transporta-
tion costs to their respective places of work are 
higher than the costs of the one-income earner. 
Both of them w i l l have to pay unemployment 
and Canada/Quebec social insurance contribu-
tions. The single income earner's contributions 
do not only buy pension coverage for himself but 
also a survivor's pension for his dependent 
spouse and children. The two-income couple 
thus subsidize the spouse of the one-income 
earner. In 1978 the National C o u n c i l of Welfare 
found that a woman and a man earning $12,000 
and $20,000 respectively were paying jointly a 
net contribution (after tax deductions) $231.20 
into the C / Q P P . T h i s entitled each of them to 
f u l l pension entitlement. A married man with an 
income of $50,000, on the other hand, only paid 
$81.49 in net contributions to be entitled to ful l 
pension entitlements for himself and 60% for his 
wife, if she survives h i m . 2 8 
Yet, in spite of the obvious bias of the tax 
system in favour of the legally married couple 
and the unfair treatment of couples with chi ld-
ren compared to childless couples as a result of 
the larger married exemption than the chi ld 
exemption, there is sufficient pressure to increase 
the existing tax discrimination on the basis of 
marital or family status even further. Efforts for 
the inclusion of full-t ime homemakers into the 
C / Q P P and its inequitable f inancing mechan-
ism, are a clear indication that the tax system 
could be used to further increase support for the 
patriarchal form of the family even more at the 
expense of women carrying a double work-load. 
T o argue in favour of family taxation and for a 
family orientation i n relation to income from 
work-related social insurance benefits presup-
poses that the work of the wife in the work force 
is valued and recognized as little as the domestic 
work of the full-time homemaker. In this way, 
women carrying a double workload in the work 
force and in the home would lose twice. 
Other Forms of Family Taxation 
T h e prevalent system of individual taxation 
i n Canada has been given a family focus i n rela-
tion to chi ld support payments from a single, 
separated or divorced spouse to the' custodial 
parent and the refundable ch i ld tax credit which 
is based on net family income. C h i l d support 
payments are considered taxable income for the 
custodial parent but provide a tax deduction for 
the parent making the payment, usually the 
father of the chi ld . T h u s the mother is taxed on 
that portion of the father's income which is tax 
deductable for h i m . The mother as the custodial 
parent who carries the actual chi ld care and 
support expenses is not granted such tax pr iv i -
leges, nor are two-parent families. 
It is hard to conceive of a rational explanation 
for this differential treatment of parents by the 
tax system. What does this tell us about parents' 
responsibility for the material support of their 
children? According to the principles of the 
Ontario L a w Reform Act, children are the mu-
tual responsibility of both their parents. If this is 
indeed the case, why does the tax system allow 
the responsibility of the absent parent to become 
a tax deduction and treat chi ld support pay-
ments as income for the custodial parent? The 
winner is the absent parent who can substan-
tially reduce his tax load i n this way if he is a 
high-income earner, and the losers are the chi ld-
ren and their mothers for whom the value of 
their fathers' support payments is reduced i n 
accordance with the marginal tax rate of the 
income bracket of their mothers. Thus middle-
and high-income women are affected by this 
more severely than low-income women. Furth-
ermore, the tax system treats chi ld support pay-
ments by one parent to the other as family 
income. T h u s the most blatant form of family 
income taxation affects separated families. 
E l ig ib i l i ty for the refundable chi ld tax credit is 
also based on a declaration of joint spousal 
income. So far, there has been little criticism of 
this requirement. Whilst most income tested 
income support programmes have a low take-up 
rate, according to government officials in Ottawa 
the take-up rate for the refundable chi ld tax 
credit is 92%. Major reasons for a low take-up rate 
of income support programmes have been assoc-
iated with people's ignorance of their rights, 
costs related to submitt ing a claim and fear of 
stigma. In the case of the refundable chi ld tax 
credit, it may also be the resistance of one spouse 
to disclose his or her income to the other. This 
would be particularly relevant in the situation of 
an alcoholic husband and a wife engaged in 
part-time work. She may be h id ing the extent of 
the hours she is working so he cannot take money 
from her she needs to cover household expenses 
and meet the needs of the children. It may also 
present problems for women whose husbands 
have a high income but do not share it with their 
family. Since the tax credit is paid to her, the 
more he earns the less cash she will receive and 
thus the material situation of the children will 
not improve. It is interesting to speculate for 
what reasons 8% of families who would have 
qualified for the tax credit did not apply for it. 
Yet, in spite of all its shortcomings, the refunda-
ble child tax credit has one specific advantage for 
custodial parents living in a common law rela-
tionship. Eligibility for the tax credit is based on 
their income alone which includes the child 
support payments, if any, from the absent parent. 
Conclusions 
T o overcome the inherent patriarchal and 
gender bias of the Canadian tax system, all tax 
deductions on the basis of sex, marital or family 
status will have to be removed.29 This will 
require a far reaching tax reform based on the 
principles of progressivity and equity.30 A re-
structured progressive tax system would place 
the tax burden on those most able to afford it. 
But progressivity alone is not enough. The 
treatment of women as the dependents of men 
has to be ended in the interest of gender equality, 
and marital status should no longer warrant any 
tax breaks. This means the elimination of the 
marital tax exemption and all other marriage 
related tax deductions. Yet, if justice demands 
gender and marital status equality, it must also 
insist on the recognition of the taking care of 
children and of physically or mentally disabled 
persons as a service that benefits society as a 
whole. Thus, the demands for tax reform, for a 
fair and equitable system of raising taxes have to 
be linked with demands for a direct provisions of 
a special allowances to parents and care-givers to 
the disabled. To overcome resistance to such 
drastic changes to the tax system, the govern-
ment in Ottawa will have to integrate child and 
care-giver allowances with progressive tax meas-
ures. The political challenge is to convince ordi-
nary Canadians to press for such change. 
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